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Multidrug-Resistant Tuberculosis in Hmong Refugees Resettling from Thailand into the United States, 2004-2005
In December 2003, the U.S. Department of State initiated a resettlement program for 15,707 Hmong refugees who had been displaced from Laos and were living on the grounds of Wat Tham Krabok, a Buddhist temple in Thailand. In January 2005, reports of tuberculosis (TB) cases among refugees still in Thailand and refugees who had arrived in the United States, including some cases caused by multidrugresistant* (MDR) strains, prompted a 1-month travel suspension. After enhanced screening in Thailand and intensified TB-control measures in the United States, resettlement resumed on February 16. A majority of the Hmong refugees in Thailand and the United States with TB diagnosed were started on treatment and monitored. As of July 15, no additional TB cases had been diagnosed among newly resettled Hmong refugees. U.S. health departments should continue to ensure careful monitoring for TB among this refugee group.
Approximately 50,000-70,000 refugees resettle in the United States each year (1) . Before resettlement, all refugees undergo medical screening to prevent importation of diseases that pose an immediate public health risk. The standard TBscreening algorithm, used in early 2004 to evaluate Hmong refugees in Thailand, includes a medical history and physical examination for all applicants and a chest radiograph for persons aged >15 years. Applicants with clinical or radiologic findings suggestive of TB disease submit three sputum specimens for acid-fast bacilli (AFB) smear microscopy. Those with positive results must begin anti-TB treatment and have follow-up specimens with consistently smear-negative results before travel to the United States is allowed. † The standard premigration algorithm was revised in May 2004 to add requirements for mycobacterial culture and drug-susceptibility testing.
During June 2004-January 2005, the United States resettled 9,459 Hmong refugees in 20 states (Table and Figure) . As the newly arrived refugees underwent health assessments at local health departments and in private health-care facilities, 37 TB cases, including four MDR cases, were reported. This finding coincided with assessments in Thailand, where 17 (33%) of 52 culture-confirmed cases among refugees were determined to be MDR. In contrast, among all new TB cases reported in the United States during 2004 with drugsusceptibility results, 1% were MDR TB (2) . Hmong refugee travel to the United States was suspended to allow for epidemiologic investigation and to prevent further importation of TB cases.
In January 2005, coordinated investigations were conducted in Thailand and the United States by the International Organization for Migration, CDC, the Thailand Ministry of Public Health, the U.S. Department of State, the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services Office of Global Health Affairs, and state and local health departments to describe the epidemiology of TB disease and to direct TBcontrol measures among the refugees. The case definition for TB disease required either 1) bacteriologic evidence (i.e., sputum-smear microscopy or culture) or 2) a decision to
Thailand
The investigation in Thailand began with an evaluation of laboratory procedures, which excluded the possibility of falsepositive culture results. Medical records of patients being treated for TB disease were reviewed, and all known patients were interviewed. Patient living quarters were mapped with global positioning system (GPS) technology to assess for potential geographic clustering of cases. Classmates of refugee children and other non-Hmong contacts were screened by chest radiograph and, if indicated, by sputum-smear microscopy. During March 2004-January 2005, a total of 272 refugees, including 11 (4%) children aged <15 years, received a diagnosis of TB disease. Thirty (11%) of the 261 persons aged >15 years had AFB sputum-smear-positive pulmonary TB. One person tested positive for human immunodeficiency virus (HIV), 258 tested negative, and results for two persons were unknown. Children aged <15 years were not routinely tested for HIV. Medical records and interviews revealed that three (18%) of the 17 culture-confirmed MDR TB patients had been treated previously for TB disease. Nine (53%) reported at least weekly contact with another MDR TB patient, and seven were linked through a social network that centered around a patient with sputum-smear-positive MDR TB. GPS mapping revealed widespread distribution of TB cases throughout the Hmong living quarters in Wat Tham Krabok (an area of 0.5 km 2 ). No additional smear-positive TB cases were detected during screenings of classmates and other nonHmong contacts in Thailand (n = 327).
In February 2005, the premigration screening algorithm for Hmong refugees was revised again. All refugees aged >6 months were rescreened with chest radiographs, and those aged 6 months to 10 years also underwent tuberculin skin testing. In addition, laboratory capacity was increased with addition of automated culture methods, access to MDR TB medications was ensured, and a team of physicians and nurses was established to provide expert case management for TB patients. Since the implementation of this enhanced algorithm, an additional 73 cases of TB disease have been diagnosed, including seven cases of MDR TB, resulting in an overall total of 345 TB cases (including 24 MDR). Patients are permitted to travel to the United States only after they have completed anti-TB treatment. As of July 15, a total of 341 Hmong refugees in Thailand had undergone treatment for TB disease under directly observed therapy, and 197 (58%) had completed treatment.
United States
Health departments in areas affected by the resettlement intensified surveillance for TB among the newly arrived refugees and continued providing diagnostic and treatment services for patients and their contacts. In addition, public health officials, resettlement agencies, and Hmong community organizations collaborated to determine educational needs and resources for sharing TB information with refugees and other members of the Hmong community in both Thailand and the United States.
California, where approximately one third of the refugees were resettled, reported 24 (65%) of the 37 TB cases, including 10 among children aged <15 years who, as directed by the initial screening algorithm, had not received a premigration TB screening. The 14 patients aged >15 years tested negative for HIV infection. Of the eight culture-confirmed cases in California, one (13%) had rifampin mono-resistance, and four (50%) were resistant to isoniazid, rifampin, ethambutol, and streptomycin. All four MDR TB patients had AFB sputumsmear-positive results. One MDR TB patient, who had initially tested rifampin-susceptible, acquired resistance to rifampin during treatment in Thailand. Local health departments have identified no secondary cases beyond immediate household members, although contact investigations continue.
Since resettlement resumed on February 16, approximately 3,500 additional Hmong refugees have been resettled to 22 states; none had TB diagnosed after arrival. Health departments continue to ensure that all recently arrived refugees are screened and treated for TB disease and infection when necessary. Health-care providers are asked to report to local and state health departments any additional TB cases detected in Hmong refugees who have arrived since June 2004.
Editorial Note: The global incidence of TB disease is increasing (3), and an increasing percentage of TB cases in the United States are occurring among foreign-born persons (2) . The Institute of Medicine has recommended that the United States strengthen its role in global TB-control activities, including enhancement of overseas TB screening and treatment capacity (4). The standard of care for TB case management includes high-quality diagnostic services and medications, consistent use of directly observed therapy, and standardized monitoring of outcomes. Emergence of MDR TB can be prevented by adhering to this standard.
The World Health Organization estimates that, when standard laboratory services are available and diagnostic criteria are applied, at least 65% of passively detected pulmonary TB cases among adults will have AFB smear-positive results (5) . In this investigation, only 11% of the cases diagnosed among refugees aged >15 years awaiting resettlement were smear positive, suggesting that active surveillance might have led to overdiagnosis. Culture confirmation of 24 MDR cases in August 5, 2005 Thailand and four MDR cases in the United States in the same refugee population within 16 months is cause for concern. Why the reported number of TB cases among resettled refugees was higher in California and why MDR TB cases among resettled refugees were found only in California remains unknown.
Because of the high prevalence of TB disease among the refugees described in this report, all are at risk for recent exposure to Mycobacterium tuberculosis. Recent infection is a major risk factor for progression to TB disease (6), but latent TB infection (LTBI) is not routinely treated in Thailand. Therefore, to prevent M. tuberculosis transmission and progression to TB disease in the United States, the domestic refugee health and TB programs affected by this resettlement should ensure postmigration monitoring and services for refugees, including treatment of LTBI.
These investigations and responses have required and will continue to demand considerable public health resources. Per person, the estimated costs of detecting disease and treating patients with LTBI range from $208 to $11,125, and the direct medical costs associated with TB and MDR TB disease range from $3,800 to $137,000, depending on case complexity. § These projections underestimate the costs for treating Hmong refugees because they exclude the additional expenses of providing culturally appropriate outreach, interpretation, and transportation services.
The annual number of immigrants to the United States continues to increase (1) , and TB is the medical condition most frequently diagnosed among applicants for permanent residence (CDC, unpublished data, 2005) . The number of imported TB cases described in this report would have been substantially greater if overseas screening had not been enhanced. For Hmong refugees resettling from Thailand, mycobacterial cultures and drug-susceptibility testing helped ensure appropriate treatment of patients with TB disease. These and other enhancements to standard premigration screening guidelines are under consideration for future U.S.-bound refugees and immigrants from other countries with a high TB burden. § Estimated costs are derived from several studies (7) (8) (9) (10) 
Fatal Injuries Among Volunteer Workers -United States, 1993-2002
In the United States, an estimated 59 million persons spend a median of 52 hours each year volunteering, most often in religious, educational, youth, or community service organizations; volunteers commonly perform activities such as coaching, campaigning, fundraising, delivering goods, and serving on boards or neighborhood associations (1) . Few studies have analyzed fatal injuries to volunteers, and studies have typically focused on a specific volunteer group (e.g., Peace Corps). To characterize fatal injuries among volunteers in the United States, CDC analyzed data from the Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) Census of Fatal Occupational Injuries (CFOI)* for 1993-2002. This report describes the results of that analysis, which indicated that a total of 501 persons died from injuries sustained while volunteering during this period; most often these persons were firefighters and other volunteers who were operating motor vehicles at the time of death. To reduce these fatalities, organizations that rely on volunteers need to provide adequate training (e.g., defensive driving and recognition of evacuation signals) on the basis of wellcommunicated and enforced safety and health policies.
CFOI classifies employee status into one of seven categories: 1) active-duty armed forces, 2) self-employed, 3) work in family business, 4) work for pay or compensation, 5) volunteer, 6) off-duty police, or 7) not reported. CFOI includes fatalities to volunteer workers if they were performing the same duties or functions as paid employees and they met the CFOI work-relationship definition. † For this study, deaths were included if the decedent's employment status category was marked "volunteer." Excluded were deaths resulting from the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001. After numbers of deaths were obtained from CFOI, rates of death among volunteers were calculated by using estimates of median annual volunteer hours worked from the September 2002 Current Population Survey (CPS) volunteer supplemental survey § (2) and converting those hours to full-time equivalents (FTEs) (i.e., 2,000 hours worked per person per year). CPS defines a volunteer as a person who performed unpaid activities for an organization (3).
During 1993-2002, three occupations accounted for approximately half of the 501 fatal injuries to volunteers: firefighters, 185 deaths (37%); nonconstruction laborers, 35 (7%); and pilots/navigators, 24 (5%). The remaining fatalities (all <4%) were distributed across 13 occupations ( Table 1 ). The single most common volunteer activity at the time of death was firefighting, for which 76 deaths (15%) were recorded. Driving a motor vehicle (e.g. automobile, truck, or farm vehicle) was recorded in 100 (21%) of the fatalities (Table 1) . Under the system used by BLS to classify industry sectors, 240 (48%) deaths related to volunteer work occurred in public administration (including firefighting), 154 (31%) in services, and 23 (5%) in agricultural forestry and fishing. Median age of victims at the time of death was 41 years; 436 (87%) of the decedents were male.
The overall rate of death among volunteers was 3.2 per 100,000 FTE population (Table 2 ). Among 189 volunteer workers aged <34 years, 103 (54%) were volunteer firefighters or firefighting supervisors. The fatal injury rates for volunteer workers aged >35 years were lower when compared with the overall volunteer death rate. The rates among volunteers aged 20-24 and 25-34 years were 7.4 and 6.5 per 100,000 FTE population, respectively, more than twice the overall volunteer death rate and higher than the 1993-2002 average annual fatality rate for all workers aged 20-24 and 25-34 years of 3.5 and 3.9 per 100,000 employed, respectively (2) . † Available at http://www.bls.gov/iif/oshcfdef.htm. Editorial Note: Certain volunteer work, such as firefighting, performing structural repairs, or collecting roadside litter can involve inherently hazardous duties or environments that increase the risk for injury or death. Volunteers engaged in this work might not be sufficiently aware of the dangers involved or any health and safety regulations associated with the work. In addition, supervisors of volunteers might not have the same authority as employers of paid persons to make certain that health and safety regulations are followed. The findings in this report indicate that 28% of all work-related volunteer fatalities occurred while driving or riding in a motor vehicle and that the decedents were most commonly firefighters. To reduce the risk for fatalities, driver training should be provided to volunteer firefighters as described in National Fire Protection Association standard 1451 (4). Other organizations using volunteer drivers should consider adopting policies and providing education that emphasizes safe driving at work (5) and in the community (6) .
The findings in this report are subject to at least four limitations. First, CFOI might not capture all volunteer fatalities (i.e., deaths to volunteers in NYC or to persons involved in a motor-vehicle crash that might not have been identified as including a volunteer). Second, although the median number of hours worked by volunteers does not change substantially from year to year (7), calculation of death rates is based on the median hours of volunteer work reported from a single CPS volunteer supplemental survey (September 2002), which uses a sample of the U.S. population. Third, volunteer firefighters, although not typically paid for their work, might receive compensation such as reimbursement for annual medical exams or worker's compensation and retirement benefits. A stateby-state comparison of benefits is available at http:// www.nvfc.org. Finally, occupation-specific fatality rates could not be calculated because volunteer occupations in the CPS survey are not categorized by using the same occupation definitions as CFOI.
Organizations that use volunteers should create or maintain policies that incorporate safety education and training into structured volunteer training and orientation. Organizations should designate persons with authority to identify and correct potential hazards and should monitor the activities of volunteers for adherence to their policies. All organizations, whether using volunteers or paid staff, should 1) identify risks and establish safety plans that include administrative measures for enforcement, 2) implement any necessary engineering controls, and 3) provide workers with any needed personal protective equipment (8 
Interim Guidance for Minimizing Risk for Human Lymphocytic Choriomeningitis Virus Infection Associated with Rodents
On July 29, this report was posted as an MMWR Dispatch on the MMWR website (http://www.cdc.gov/mmwr).
In May 2005, CDC received reports of four organtransplant recipients with unknown illness. All were discovered to have been infected with lymphocytic choriomeningitis virus (LCMV) via a common organ donor (1). Epidemiologic investigation traced the source of the virus to a pet hamster purchased by the donor from a local pet store. LCMV testing of other rodents at the pet store revealed three other LCMV-infected rodents (two hamsters and a guinea pig), supplied by a single distributor (distributor A). Preliminary laboratory testing of hamsters from distributor A has identified an infection rate of approximately 3% among the animals sampled. The facility of distributor A is under quarantine until it can be documented as free of LCMV infection. This report provides background information on LCMV and interim guidance* for the public on reducing risk for LCMV infection from pet rodents.
Background Information
LCMV is a rodent-borne arenavirus endemic in house mouse (Mus musculus) populations worldwide (3) (4) (5) . Pet rodents (e.g., hamsters and guinea pigs) can become infected with LCMV after contact with wild rodents at a breeding facility, pet store, or home. The prevalence of LCMV in pet rodents is not known. Although other animals could possibly become infected with the virus, documented infections in humans have occurred only after exposure to infected mice, guinea pigs, and hamsters (6, 7) .
LCMV infection in humans with normal immune systems usually causes either asymptomatic or mild, self-limited illness, characterized by any or all of the following symptoms: fever, malaise, lack of appetite, muscle aches, headache, nausea, and vomiting. Aseptic meningitis also can occur in some patients, but the infection is rarely fatal (6) . LCMV infection during the first or second trimester of pregnancy can cause severe illness or developmental defects in the fetus, including hydrocephalus, psychomotor retardation, and blindness (8) ; the proportion of developmental defects caused by LCMV is not known. Serologic studies of previous infection in humans in urban areas of the United States have demonstrated a prevalence of previous LCMV in those populations of approximately 5% (3).
Person-to-person transmission has not been associated with LCMV, except for transmission from mother to fetus or through organ transplantation (1) . Human infection occurs most commonly through exposure (by direct contact or aerosol) to secretions or excretions of infected animals (9) . LCMV infection is a well-known occupational risk for laboratory workers who work with LCMV-infected laboratory rodents (9) .
An outbreak associated with pet hamsters sold by a single distributor was reported in 1974, when 181 symptomatic cases in persons with hamster contact were identified in 12 states; no deaths occurred (10) . The outbreak was brought under control by voluntary cessation of sale and destruction of the infected breeding stock.
Control of Wild Rodents
Environmental modifications and hygiene practices that deter rodents from colonizing the home and work environment are the best means of reducing risk for exposure to infectious rodents. In addition, if rodents are found in work or living areas, safe practices for cleaning rodent waste and nesting materials are recommended. Preventing wild rodent entry also reduces opportunity for infection of pet rodents.
Detailed instructions on rodent-proofing, safe cleaning practices, and trapping wild rodents are available at http://www.cdc. gov/ncidod/dvrd/spb/mnpages/dispages/lcmv.htm. * These recommendations were assembled by a CDC working group to provide interim guidelines for protection of public health. Guidelines for care of laboratory animals have been published previously (2) . In addition, the National Association of State Public Health Veterinarians, in conjunction with partners, is developing a set of comprehensive veterinary infection-control guidelines.
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General Recommendations for Preventing LCMV Infection from Pet Rodents
Hamsters and other rodents are common pets, and the number of documented human LCMV infections from pet hamsters and other rodents is low. Basic precautions can reduce the risk for acquiring LCMV and other infections from pet rodents. Because rodents might not always exhibit signs of ill health resulting from LCMV infection, CDC recommends taking appropriate precautions with any rodent:
• The public should be apprised of the risk for LCMV infection from rodents purchased from any pet store.
• Destruction or return of recently purchased pet rodents is not recommended. The probability of any one animal harboring LCMV infection is low. All pets are potential carriers of infectious diseases and should always be handled by using appropriate precautions.
• Pet rodents must not be released into the wild to prevent introduction of nonnative species to North America.
• Persons with specific concerns regarding the health of their pets should seek guidance from a veterinarian.
Purchasing a Healthy Pet
Information on purchasing a healthy pet and general steps to prevent pet rodents from bringing diseases into the home is available at http://www.cdc.gov/healthypets/lcmv_rodents.htm.
Care of Pet Rodents
Anyone handling or keeping pet rodents should take the following precautions to reduce the risk for LCMV infection:
• Wash hands with soap and water (or alcohol-based hand sanitizers when soap is unavailable and hands are not visibly soiled) after handling pet rodents or cleaning up pet droppings, cages, or areas where pets have been.
• Keep rodent cages clean and free of soiled bedding.
• Clean cages outdoors or in a well-ventilated area.
• Closely supervise young children when cleaning cages or handling rodents and supervise or assist children in washing their hands immediately after handling rodents and rodent cages or bedding.
• Never kiss or hold pet rodents close to the face.
• Never allow pet rodents to come into contact with wild rodents or their droppings or nests. Cover pet rodent cages and food supplies and always supervise pet rodents when they are not in their cages.
Precautions for Pregnant Women
Although the risk for LCMV infection from pet rodents is low, pregnant women or women who think they might become pregnant should be aware of the risks associated with LCMV infection during pregnancy. The following precautions can be taken to reduce the risk for acquiring LCMV infection during pregnancy:
• Avoid contact with wild rodents. Pregnant women who reside in a household with a wild rodent infestation should have the infestation addressed promptly by a professional pest control company or another member of the household.
• Keep pet rodents in a separate part of the home. Pregnant women should ask another family member or friend to clean the cage and care for the pet or arrange for temporary adoption of the pet by a responsible person. Pregnant women should avoid prolonged stays in any room where a rodent resides.
Precautions for Persons with Weakened Immune Systems
For the organ recipients described in this report, transplantation of LCMV-infected organs into persons with medically induced immunosuppression likely increased disease severity. Persons with impaired immune-system function should avoid contact with all rodents.
Testing for LCMV in Pet Rodents
CDC does not recommend testing pet rodents. Serologic testing on rodents can be inaccurate and misleading. All pet animals should be assumed capable of transmitting certain infectious diseases.
Testing for LCMV in Humans
Testing for LCMV infection in asymptomatic persons is not necessary. Similarly, testing persons with previous history of LCMV-compatible illness generally is not useful. Persons with active disease suggestive of LCMV should seek medical care and report any exposures to wild or pet rodents. A physician should determine whether testing for LCMV is indicated. Physicians should work closely with their respective state health departments to discuss forwarding of samples to state laboratories or CDC for testing.
Tiered Use of Inactivated Influenza Vaccine in the Event of a Vaccine Shortage
The United States has experienced disruptions in the manufacture or distribution of inactivated influenza vaccine during three of the last five influenza seasons (1-3) .
and would be adequate to satisfy historical demand for influenza vaccine among persons considered by the Advisory Committee on Immunization Practices (ACIP) to be at high risk for serious complications associated with influenza virus infection, health-care workers, and household contacts of children aged <6 months (Table) . These groups were prioritized for influenza vaccination in 2004-05 (3). Additional doses of inactivated influenza vaccine might be available for the U.S. market in 
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2005-06, but this cannot yet be confirmed. Availability of additional vaccine would allow for expansion of the priority groups and, preferably, vaccination of all persons who desire it. During periods of inactivated influenza vaccine shortfall, vaccination is prioritized on the basis of risk for serious influenza-associated complications. CDC and ACIP recommend use of vaccination priority groups only in the event of vaccine supply disruptions. At present, CDC and ACIP do not recommend prioritization of inactivated influenza vaccine for the 2005-06 season. Current recommendations for use of influenza vaccine were published recently (4). However, to help vaccine providers develop contingency plans for the upcoming influenza season in the event of a shortfall, this report details the priority groups for vaccination (Table) . Announcement of a need for prioritization will be made promptly upon receipt of information indicating a potential disruption to the vaccine supply, if necessary.
ACIP and CDC determined the priority groups, ranked in three tiers, on the basis of influenza-associated mortality and hospitalization rates (Table) . In the event of an influenza vaccine shortfall, persons in tier 1 should be vaccinated preferentially, followed by persons in tier 2, then persons in tier 3. On rare occasions when local vaccine supply is extremely limited, state and local health officials and vaccination providers should prioritize persons in group 1A before all other groups. However, in all other vaccine shortfall situations, persons in groups 1A, 1B, and 1C should be considered equivalent and should be vaccinated simultaneously. Eligible persons in group 1C and tiers 2 and 3 should be encouraged to receive live, attenuated influenza vaccine during periods of inactivated influenza vaccine shortfall. The panel will consider all information received and revise the competency documents for publication. Questions regarding competencies for applied epidemiology or the development process can be e-mailed to CSTE at competencies@cste.org. On page 6, under the section "Children," the first sentence should read, "Children aged >6 months can develop protective levels of anti-influenza antibody against specific influenza virus strains after influenza vaccination (69,70,78-81), although the antibody response among children at high risk for influenza-related complications might be lower than among healthy children (82,83)."
Notice to Readers
Applied Epidemiology Competency Development
Errata
On page 18, under the section "LAIV Dosage and Administration," the fourth sentence should read, "Alternatively, the vaccine can be thawed in a refrigerator and stored at 2 º C-8 º C for up to 60 hours before use."
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